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    Abstract 
In his new book Unequal Democracy, Larry Bartels finds that rich constituents are 
substantially better represented by the legislators in the US Senate than their poorer 
counterparts. In fact, the poorest third of the population is not represented at all. While 
we do not find evidence directly contradictory this finding, we add some complications. 
First, we solve a methodological problem caused by the fact that the weights used in the 
existing literature render the results scale variant. Second, we replicate Bartels’ findings 
in two recent datasets with larger sample sizes and hence less measurement error. We 
cannot find statistical evidence of differential representation. A contributing reason is that 
ideological preferences among different income strata of state electorates are almost 
impossible to separate statistically. 
Introduction 
 In his widely (and justly) acclaimed new book, Unequal Democracy, Larry 
Bartels (2008) presents the case that the rich get more representation than the poor. 
Among other findings, we learn that Republican administrations serve to advance income 
inequality rather than retard it. And we learn that Republicans are capable of fooling 
voters, although not for the reasons that Thomas Frank (2004) offers in What’s the Matter 
with Kansas? Among the most provocative findings is that when it comes to 
representation in the US Senate (as measured by roll call voting), the poor—unlike the 
well-to-do—get virtually no representation at all. That is, when Senators take into 
account (or respond in some indirect fashion) to public opinion, only the views of the 
relatively rich and—to a lesser extent middle-income voters—matter. Based on Bartels’ 
statistical analysis, the views of the relatively poor are not visibly represented at all. 
 In terms of senatorial representation, is political inequality as severe as Bartels 
makes out? While one would certainly expect that affluence would have something to do 
with influence over Congress, the degree of inequality reported by Bartels is stronger 
than one might expect to be the case. In this paper we investigate further. We replicate 
and extend Bartels’ analysis, while presenting certain methodological hurdles that hinder 
a decisive verdict. In the end, this paper does not challenge Bartels’s verdict of unequal 
representation as necessarily incorrect. However we do offer what we believe to be 
compelling reasons to interpret the evidence with considerable caution. 
Some Theory 
 Before turning to the statistical evidence, it is helpful to review the reasons why 
senatorial representation would be expected to be unequal. That is, why would Senators 
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be more responsive to the opinions of the rich than the poor? Bartels mentions several 
reasons. The rich are more attentive and more likely to vote. Second, the rich are more 
likely to contribute to campaigns. For these reasons, reelection-seeking Senators have 
reason to pay more attention to rich opinion than to poor opinion. Moreover, Senators are 
themselves from the social strata of the relatively rich. To some extent, they would share 
the views of the relatively rich and interact with constituents who themselves are 
relatively rich. To the extent that the poor are invisible to Senate members, it is unlikely 
that Senators consider the views of the poor. 
 At the same time, as Bartels acknowledges, these are only relative differences. 
The statistical analysis suggests that the top third in income gets most of the 
representation while the bottom third gets none. Many citizens in the bottom third vote 
and many in the top third do not. While the relatively affluent give more to campaigns, it 
is an elite strata of the top third in income—who give the most. These considerations 
make it puzzling that the gap in representation between the moderately rich and 
moderately poor is as great as Bartels’ statistical analysis would suggest. 
 There is also another consideration. Following the lead of Miller and Stokes’ 
(1963) classic study of congressional representation, political scientists are prone to 
discuss representation as a phenomenon that is solely due to the actions of the 
representatives. When scholars theorize about why legislators represent (or not represent) 
constituency opinion, the focus usually is on the supply side—why, deliberately or 
incidentally, legislators end up following constituency wishes. The demand side should 
not be ignored. Voters also play a role. At least potentially, they sort candidates into 
winners and losers in part based on their ideological proximity to the candidates. At a 
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minimum, members of Congress—including Senators—behave as if they believe this to 
be true. Otherwise they would be indifferent to constituency representation. Political 
scientists—going back to Miller and Stokes’ classic works—sometimes write as if 
legislators overestimate constituency attention to their behavior. While this is possible, 
one could also bring forward a “rational expectations” argument that legislators do not 
make systematic mistakes. That is, given their relative utilities for voting correctly in 
terms of their personal ideological values and voting to stay elected, representatives 
weigh the goals correctly in terms of maximizing their long-term welfare.  
 The implication of this line of theorizing is that legislators know what they are 
doing. If they respond to public opinion generally (as they seem to do), they respond with 
good reason rather than with unjustified inflation of their visibility to constituents. But if 
we take Bartels’ finding of differential representation seriously, then legislators rationally 
ignore the poor. For such behavior to be rational, Senators are indeed invisible to the poor 
while sufficiently visible to the well-to-do for Senators to give the rich their attention. To 
come full circle, for Senators to ignore the poor is rational only if the poor ignore their 
Senators 
 Based on Bartels’ analysis it is unlikely that Senators overestimate the attention 
they receive from their poorer constituents. But consider the opposite—a world where 
Senators mistakenly ignore the poor while the poor do pay attention and—just like their 
affluent counterparts—vote their legislators in or out based on the proximity of candidate 
positions to their own. The outcome is the positive representation of poor constituents, as 
the poor have some ability to elect and keep Senators who share their views and reject 
those who do not.  
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 The net result of this theorizing is that for it to make sense for the poor to get no 
representation of their views in the Senate, the poor must indeed be inattentive to their 
Senators. If Bartels’ research is correct, the implication is not only that Senators freely 
ignore the views of the poor. It also follows that the poor must ignore the fact that they 
are not represented.  
Bartels’ Analysis and Replication 
 Bartels’s analyses the relationship between state opinion and senatorial liberalism 
for three Congresses following the elections of 1988, 1990, and 1992. These Congresses 
were chose because the 1988, 1990 and 1992 elections were the venue for the American 
National Election Study’s “Senate” study in which the respondents in larger than usual 
state samples were interviewed for the purpose of analyzing senatorial representation. 
The Senate study was designed to provide equal sample sizes in each state, resulting in an 
average of 185 respondents per state ranging between 151 and 223.1
 To estimate the degree of Senate representation in general, Bartels modeled 
Senator conservatism (the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal’s W-nominate scores) 
on party affiliation and the state mean self-identification on the NES’s 7-point ideology 
scale. Bartels converted the seven point scale to one ranging from -1 to +1 (e.g., 1 
becomes -1, 7 becomes 1). As will be shown below, this seemingly harmless coding 
decision makes a difference. 
 As Bartels’ analysis makes clear (see Figure 9.1 on page 256), state public 
opinion is a strong predictor of senatorial roll call ideology, even with the Senator’s party 
affiliation controlled. We show this strong relationship in Table 1, where both 
                                                 
1 The numbers drops slightly when we take into account non-respondents to the ideology question and its 
follow up. Thus, an average of 171 valid respondents could be used in the analysis, ranging from 138 to 
209. 
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partisanship and state ideology (measured as Bartels does from the NES Senate study) are 
strong predictors of W-nominate first dimension scores over the three Congresses 
following the 1988, 1990, and 1992 election. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 The general fact that state opinion influences roll call behavior is not in question. 
At issue is the equality of the representation process. Do some opinions matter more than 
others? Specifically, is it mainly the opinions of the affluent that count? 
 After first demonstrating that state opinion matters for Senate roll call voting, 
even with Senator party controlled, Bartels turns to the test that is crucial for this 
discussion. Bartels separates opinion by the lowest third, the middle third, and the highest 
third on family income where the thirds are defined by the national division. That is, 
separate mean ideologies are calculated for each of three income groups in each state. 
The lowest group is composed of individuals with a family income below $20,000, in the 
middle-income group the income ranges from $20,000 to $40,000, while respondents 
with family income above $40,000 are assigned to the high-income group. Using a 
methodological principle that has been employed elsewhere (e.g., Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993; Clinton 2006), Bartels decomposes state opinion into three separate 
variables: The notation is ours. 
 Low-income ideology times proportion in the low-income category: 
  LL PX
_
 Middle-income ideology times the proportion in the middle-income category
  MM PX
_
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 High-income ideology times proportion in the high-income category 
              HH PX
_
Where = mean ideology among the income group G within the state sample and = 
the proportion within the sample in income group G. Had Bartels only measured Senator 
ideology as a function of the raw mean group ideologies ( ), he would had captured 
the Senators’ responsiveness to the actual groups in the population which varies across 
states. Hence, the purpose multiplying the proportions ( ) with the raw mean group 
ideologies ( ) is to take into account the different sizes of the groups in the electorate 
and thereby to create a common baseline for comparison. Bartels measures ideology by 
recoding scores on the original NES seven point 1-7 scale into a scale from -1 to +1. The 
original “1” becomes -1; the original “7” becomes +1, etc. The midpoint shifts from 4 to 









 To sum up, with individual Senators as the unit of analysis, Bartels match the first 
dimension of the W-nominates (dependent variable) with subgroup constituency 
ideologies weighted by the proportion of the groups in each state. A Republican Senator 
dummy is added to allow for party-specific behavior independent of constituency 
influence. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 We show Bartels’ original finding for the pooled 101-103 Congresses in Table 2, 
column 1. Senate W-nominate scores are highly responsive to party plus high-income 
opinion and (to a lesser extent) middle-income opinion. The coefficients for high-income 
opinion and middle-income opinion achieve a high level of statistical significance, 
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suggesting that these groups gain considerable representation in the US Senate. But for 
the low-income third, the coefficient is non-significant and actually negative in sign. This 
is the crucial finding that suggests that for poor folks, there is no representation in the 
upper chamber of Congress. 
 When we try to replicate Bartels’ equation, we come passably close, as shown in 
column 2 of Table 2. So this is the starting point of our investigation. Would further 
analysis lead to the discovery of anything different? The first step of our investigation 
was a seemingly innocuous variation. We repeated the model with the only change being 
a rescaling of the key independent variables on the original scale of 1 to 7 rather than -1 
to +1. The results are in column 3 of Table 2.  
 One’s first thought is that the equations of column two and three should be 
identical except for the matter of scale since scores on the -1 to +1 scale correlate 
perfectly with the scores on the 1 to 7 scale. One can refer back to Table 1 to see that this 
is true about total opinion. When the scale range is stretched by a factor of three from 2 
points (-1 to +1) to 6 points (1-7 rather than 2 points (-1 to +1), the coefficients are 
identical except for the proportional shrinkage of the opinion coefficient by one third.  
 But when opinion is measured separately by income group, as in Table 2, scale 
matters. Observe first that by replacing the -1 to +1 scale with the 1 to 7 scale, the 
explained variance (adjusted R squared) actually declines slightly from .85 to .83. 
Crucially, the relative sizes and significance levels of the three components of state 
opinion also changed. Taking the equation in column 3 at face value, opinion is about 
equally influential among low-income, middle-income, and high-income families. 
Moreover, the coefficients are “statistically significant” at the .001 level for all three 
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income groups. Thus by measuring ideology on a 7 point scale instead of a 2 point scale, 
we have transformed our result into one approaching a utopia of equal and strong 
ideological representation. General state public opinion matters and matters big when 
predicting Senatorial roll call behavior, regardless of scaling. 
 Clearly something is amiss. The problem lies in the algebra with which the 
independent variables in Table 1 are constructed. Recall that our three opinion variables 
are each a multiplicative term, with the within-group state mean multiplied by the 
proportion of the state sample within the group category. When we modify the original 
measures of state’s income-category mean opinion by adding or subtracting a constant for 
all values, we transform so that the initial coefficients for ideology effects (depicted 
below as betas) change to represent the composite weighted contribution of group 
ideology plus the proportion in the group (depicted below as gammas).  
 Let us examine algebraically what happens when we add an arbitrary constant (k) 
to the state mean and thus replace the original set of estimates of relative state opinion 
effects (the βs) with the new ones (the γs). 
 For low-income ideology, 
          is replaced by          LLL PX
_β )()( __ LLLLLLL kPPXPkX +=+ γγ
For middle-income ideology, 
MMM PX
_β        is replaced by          )()( __ MMMMMMM kPPXPkX +=+ γγ
And similarly, for high-income ideology, 
HHH PX
_β         is replaced by          )()( __ HHHHHHH kPPXPkX +=+ γγ
 8
 As long as the  and ”effects” are zero, adding the constant makes no 
difference. But they will not be zero, because these “effects” are the accounting 
mechanisms that anchor the equation when the state mean and proportion within the 
income category are “zero.” By arbitrarily adding or subtracting a constant k, one can 
change the order and the signs of the relative effects ideology within the three income 
categories. We have already seen this when we shift from a -1 to +1 range for ideology to 
a 1 to 7 range. The culprit is not the expansion of the range from 2 to 6 points, but rather 
the shift of the “midpoint” from zero to four. 
,, ML PP HP
 The problem is readily solved, however, by simply incorporating the proportions 
in the categories as additional variables. With three categories, adding the proportion 
low-income and the proportion high-income are sufficient as they perfectly define the 
proportion in the middle as the portion left over from one hundred percent. With this step, 
adding an arbitrary constant will not affect the estimate of the relative contributions of 
income categories. The relative effects of ’s become scale invariant. The relative 
effects of the ’s however will indeed vary, as they remain conditional on the 
(arbitrary) choice of zero point. Thus any substantive interpretation of the relative  







 We see the result of adding coefficients for the ’s in Table 3. The new table 
appears to validate Bartels’ original finding: Now, both Bartels’ -1 to +1 scale and the 
original 1 to 7 scale yield the same substantive result. With controls for proportions in the 
low-income and high-income category controlled, the relative impact of ideology within 
the state appears to be highest for high-income voters, next highest for middle-income 
GP
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voters, and nonexistent (actually negative) for low-income voters. The two sets of 
estimates are equivalent with the 1-7 estimates being exactly three times those with the -1 
to +1 scale. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 We have also replicated Bartels’ separate analyses of Democrats and of 
Republicans while adding as independent variables the proportion high-income and the 
proportion low-income. As before, the estimated impact of high-income opinion is 
positive and significant; the estimated impact of middle-income opinion is also but less 
so; and the estimated impact of low-income opinion is trivial and actually negative. So 
like Bartels, our replication finds that even Democratic Senators appear unresponsive to 
low-income opinion. We also performed separate analyses excluding the South, and 
excluding the south separately by party of the Senator. In each case the essential findings 
are unmoved.  
 So far, our analysis supports Bartels. Analyzing the same NES Senate data as he 
did, we find considerable evidence for public opinion influencing roll call behavior, but 
only for citizens of sufficiently high-income. We should not lose sight of the fact that 
opinion generally seems influential (Table 1); it is just that some opinions count more 
than others. And this paper has not yet even mentioned the problem of measurement 
error.  
 For further understanding, we replicated a step that Bartels reports in a footnote. 
Instead of dividing state samples into three groups based on the national income division, 
we divided each states into thirds based on income within the state, allotting each group 
(low-income, middle-income, and large income) as close to one third of the sample of 
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opinion-holders as possible. Then we ran a simple regression predicting roll call W-
nominate scores from Senator party affiliation plus mean scores in each state’s lowest 
third, middle third, and highest third in terms of family income. The advantage is that 
these results require no correction by proportion since each state’s sub-samples are 
designed to be roughly equal in size. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Table 4 shows the results. The first and second column shows an equation 
predicting W-nominate scores from the Senator’s party plus the mean ideology of each of 
the three income groups in the NES sample. We see once again that high-income 
respondents appear to matter but not low-income respondents. The difference is that this 
time respondents’ placement in their income category is based on their income relative to 
income of other families in their home state rather than their classification in the national 
income breakdown.  
 An important issue when using survey generated means to predict legislative 
behavior is the measurement error in the ideology variables. Large as the samples are for 
the NES Senate study, their use produces wobbly estimates when the data is sliced by 
income groups. The mean N’s for the low-income, medium income, and high-income 
samples are, respectively, only 48, 68, and 54 cases per state. We draw on sampling 
theory to estimate the measurement error and reliability of the three sets of ideology 
scores based on states’ N’s and within-state variances and the observed between-state 
variances. Reliability estimates for these data suggest that less than more than half the 
variance of the three income group means is actually sampling error rather than variance 
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in true state means - more specifically, the reliabilities are .41, .48 and .50 for the low-
income, middle-income and high-income groups respectively.2
 This assessment represents both bad news and good news. The bad news is that 
estimates of the effects should be taken as more uncertain than the coefficients in Tables 
1-4 would suggest. The good news is that in general, the measurement error attenuates 
the relationships so that the error must tilt in the direction of underestimation of the 
magnitudes of state opinion effects. In short, we should expect even more representation 
generally than reported so far in these pages. 
 The reliabilities are in this case unfortunately too small to run errors-in-variables 
regression. This calls for further examination, using dataset with higher sample sizes with 
the purpose of obtaining higher reliabilities. Thus, below we examine Bartels’ findings 
using two new large datasets, namely the Annenberg surveys 2000-2004 and exit poll 
data from the 2004 election. 
New Data I: Annenberg 2000-2004 
 We replicated the findings from the Senate study by pooling the Annenberg 
surveys from 2000 and 2004. Unlike the NES Senate study, the Annenberg study was 
designed as a national study, with the implication that state sample sizes vary widely, in 
proportion to the states’ populations. The advantage is that they provide us with 
extremely high sample sizes and hence less measurement error in the main independent 
variables. When the 2000 and 2004 surveys are pooled, a total of 155,000 respondents are 
                                                 
2 We calculated the reliability for the three groups using the following formula based on sampling theory: 
Reliability= (total variance-error variance)/total variance. The total variance is simply the observed 
between-state variance, i.e. the variance of state ideology means of the group in question across states. The 
error variance is the within-state variance. It is obtained by first taking the variance for the group in 
question in each state and divide with the number of valid observations for that group in the states. Then 
the mean is taken of these state-specific within variances. The intuition is the greater variance between 
states compared to the (within-state) error variance, the higher reliability. 
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available. This is a substantial improvement compared to the 9,253 respondents available 
to Bartels. Thus, we can expect the income-specific mean ideology scores to be estimated 
with a much higher reliability with this new dataset. Furthermore, using the Annenberg 
surveys allows us to test Bartels’ findings across time (2000-2004 compared to 1988-
1992). Note the downside of the Annenberg surveys is that they were sampled nationally 
and not state-wise as the NES Senate study, resulting in very unequal sample sizes across 
states.3  
 Apart from the higher sample size, the main relevant difference between the 
Annenberg surveys and the Senate study is that ideology is measured on a 1 to 5 scale 
instead of a 1 to 7. As in the previous analysis, we recode the measure to -1 and 1. For 
simplicity only the recoded measure will be presented below. The dependent variable is 
still 1st dimension of W-nominate. As with NES Senate data, using the Annenberg data 
results in a strong effect of state opinion on roll calls (Table 5).4 It is the equality of 
opinion that is at issue. 
[Tables  5, 6 about here] 
 In Table 6 we have applied the methodology from Bartels (2008) to the 
Annenberg surveys.   At first sight, the results seem to verify the findings from Table 3. 
There is statistical evidence that Senators are representative of high-income ideology, 
while the coefficient for the poorest third is insignificant. However, a Wald test for the 
difference between low-income representation and high-income representation fails the 
                                                 
3 The state-level sample sizes varied between 344 (Wyoming) and 15,419 (California) in the Annenberg 
pooled file, while it ranged between 151 (New York) and 223 (Idaho) in the Senate study. 
4 The effect coefficient is even stronger than in NES Senate study, since the larger sample sizes render it 
less attenuated. 
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.05 threshold. That is, we cannot find statistical evidence for a difference between the 
low-income and high-income group.  
 
 Now why is that? If we compare the Annenberg results with the Senate study, two 
main differences emerge. First, though still insignificant, the low-income ideology now 
has a positive coefficient. This might be an artefact of the specific samples (the Table 3 
coefficients lies within the confidence interval of the low-income coefficient above). 
Second, a most important, the standard errors on the coefficients are more than twice in 
magnitude in the Annenberg results compared to the 1988-1992 results. This can be 
ascribed to the fact that the income categories are much more internally correlated in the 
Annenberg data (low-middle 64, low-high .67 and middle-high .86) compared to the 
Senate study (low-middle .31, low-high .31 and middle-high .33). This results in higher 
multicollinearity and thus higher standard errors.5  
 The results are substantively equivalent when we base the income groups upon 
state-specific definitions (Table 7, column 1). High-income ideology is the only 
significant ideology variable but is not significant differently from low-income ideology. 
As in table 4 we exclude the proportions, since each group on average contains one-third 
of the respondents. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 An advantage of the Annenberg data compared to the NES Senate study is the 
higher reliabilities which allows us to run errors-in-variables regression (Table 7, column 
2). Using sampling theory, reliabilities of .70 (low-income), .88 (middle-income) and .95 
                                                 
5 When corrected for reliability, the correlations among the ideology scores for the income groups in the 
Senate study are approximately  twice as high as observed. 
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(high-income) are obtained. The differences in the reliabilities are mainly due to lower 
true variance in the low-income group than in the two other groups. The lower reliability 
for low-income could mean that it is differentially attenuated, i.e. that part of tendency 
towards larger high-income coefficient is a statistical artefact.  
 When errors-in-variables is applied (Table 7, column 2) , the coefficients increase 
somewhat in magnitude, and the relative difference between low-income and high-
income decrease further. This supports the conclusion that robust statistical evidence for 
uneven representation cannot be found in the Annenberg data. 
New Data II: The 2004 Exit Polls 
 As a further data set, we replicate the Senate study findings using the 2004 state 
exit polls. The advantage is as above that the large state samples allow an expansion of 
the state N’s to an average of 1350 (summed across income categories) and a minimum 
of 584. Thus most Ns per income category are in the multiple hundreds, an advantage 
over the Annenberg study with its more uneven set of N’s per state. One obvious 
difference from the NES Senate data and the Annenberg data is that exit polls are limited 
to voters only. Also, the exit poll mean ideology scores are based on a 3 point scale, 
where respondents are only allowed to declare themselves as liberals, moderates, or 
conservatives, with no categories in-between. We calibrate this ideology scale as -1= 
liberal, 0=moderate, and +1=conservative. Applied to the exit poll data, we use three 
measures of Senator ideology in the 109th Congress: Pool and Rosenthal’s DW-nominate 
scores on dimension 1, DW-nominate scores on dimension 2, and a composite, weighing 
the second dimension .0.35 the amount of the first (.74 times dimension 1 and .26 times 
dimension 2). 
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[Table 8 about here] 
 Table 8 displays the estimated effects for dependent variables, using the national 
income categories6 and weighting within-category means by their proportions.  Relating 
Senate ideology to opinion within income groups in the 2004 exit polls, we find some 
pattern of senatorial responsiveness to opinion. However, while the coefficients for all 
three groups for all three versions of the dependent variable are positive, they are most 
positive for low-income opinion. This is an outcome that does not seem right, and will be 
challenged below. One possibility is that breaking down exit poll opinion by income 
group adds virtually nothing to the prediction of Senator behavior. 
[Table 9 about here] 
 Consider that if we substitute ideological means for the entire state sample (Table 
9) we obtain not only highly significant coefficients but also virtually the same explained 
variance as when parsing by income. When each of the three dependent variables of 
Table 8 is predicted from party and net state ideology alone, the adjusted R squared is 
within a point or two of those shown with the more elaborate model. 
 A problem with the Senate exit poll data is that mean ideology scores for the three 
income categories were highly correlated (.90 high-middle, .85 middle-low and .75 high-
low). When measured from this exit poll data, the three income groups move together. If 
a state is liberal, all three groups are relatively liberal; if it is conservative, all three 
                                                 
6 Low-income voters are defined as under $30,000 in family income (22 percent). High-income voters are 
defined as those with $75,000 or over in family income (33%). The remainder who revealed their income 
were coded as middle-income voters.  We used the $30,000 threshold to distinguish low-income voters 
from middle-income voters even though it reduces the low-income percent to barely over one fifth because 
the next highest income category in the exit poll questionnaire ($30-$50 K) contains 22 percent of all 
voters.  
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groups are relatively conservative. This extreme multicollinearity rendered problematical 
any attempt to separate the effects of opinion across income groups.  
 A different but also odd verdict arises when exit poll respondents are classified by 
thirds of income within their state. For this exercise we divide the state exit poll 
electorate into precise thirds for the division into low, medium, and high-income 
respondents. We do in a slightly refined way compared to in the previous sections. When 
voters in an income category span the percentile threshold between the first and second or 
the second and final third of the income categories, their group identity is assigned 
proportionally. For instance when voters in an income category are between the 27.3 and 
35.3 percentile, they are assigned .75 to the low-income group and .25 to the middle-
income group. One advantage of doing it this way is that we no longer need to consider 
the proportions within each group—they are all .333 by construction. The correlations of 
state ideology across these three groups remain high—between .83 and .91. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
 Table 10 shows the results. If one differentiates one group that is least influential 
from Table 10 it is low-income voters. On the presumably most salient first dimension, 
middle-income ideology appears as most influential, but the positive coefficient is not 
statistically significant. High-income voters have a particularly positive (and significant) 
coefficient on the second dimension, as if this dimension—dealing with issues such as 
civil rights and civil liberties-- has special significance to high-income voters.  
 We should not, however, put much weight on the results of either Table 8 or 
Table 10. In only one of the six equations, are the three ideology variables significantly 
different from each other. Oddly, that is for the composite measure of roll call ideology in 
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Table 8. In general, the coefficients vary widely but with large standard errors that 
dampen confidence in the estimates. The collinearity makes it difficult for the researcher 
to distinguish among the effects of ideology for the different income groups. Perhaps this 
challenge is also true for Senators. The evidence just examined would suggest that 
Senators see the same relative differences across states whether they observe the opinions 
of high or low-income voters. 
 Based on the Exit poll data, Senators are highly responsive to state opinion—as 
much if not more so as circa 1990, the time of the Senate study. What has changed is that 
in 2004 ideology within income categories tended to move together as the states tended to 
be uniformly liberal or conservative across income categories, unlike for circa 1990 when 
the mean ideology scores for the three income groups were relatively uncorrelated with 
each other. 
An Important note on Mean Scores 
 From the focus on the influence of state opinion by income group, one might 
think that the question is whether a liberal underclass is getting its proper representation 
relative to a conservative middle class or perhaps a reactionary economic elite. At least 
when opinion is measured by self-identified ideology, this is not the correct framing. 
Ideological identification does not necessarily correlate as one might expect with income. 
In the Senate Study data,  the three income groups were essentially tied in terms of mean 
ideological identification and with the poor actually the slightly most conservative group 
and the rich actually the slightly most liberal group. The Annenberg data has the groups 
in their “correct” order  (poor = liberal, etc.) but only by a slim margin.. Only in the 2004 
exit poll data does one find that the mean self-identification of the three income groups 
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decidedly follow in its stereotypical pattern of conservatism increasing with one’s 
position on the income ladder. (Consult Tables 11, 13, and 15 in the Appendix to this 
paper.) 
 This set of facts should help to place the findings of this paper in perspective. 
Perhaps we get the expected order among exit poll voters because among voters ideology 
follows the rich vs. poor gradient but among nonvoters it does not.  In any case, for those 
seeking evidence of class-based opinion structure, ideological identification is not the 
place to look. Indeed one might argue that in terms of ideological identification, ignoring 
the views of the poor is a non-problem, since states’ views tend to be systematically 
shared by rich and poor alike. As a question for further research, it might be worthwhile 
to explore differential representation not on self-describe ideology but rather some 
concrete domestic policy issues, such as differences between the rich and poor in terms of 
taxing and spending.  
Conclusions 
 When Larry Bartels in Unequal Democracy (2008) examined inequality in 
representation, his finding was unambiguous: the richest third of the population is 
substantially better represented than their poorest counterparts. In fact the poorest third is 
not represented in the voting behavior of US Senators at all. Our reinvestigation is not 
directly contradictory to Bartels’ but suggests that assessing the degree of inequality in 
representation is more complicated than it might seem. 
 First, the results are not scale invariant, when proportions are added to the raw 
mean scores as done in the existing literature. Though it ultimately turned out not to 
challenge Bartels’ results, we found two ways of dealing with this. First, one can add the 
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proportions to the equations in order to make the relative results insensitive to zero point. 
Second, and perhaps more elegantly, the definition of the groups can be change to thirds 
in each state instead of nationally. This is exactly what the proportions were intended to 
correct for. 
 We also re-examined Bartels’ findings using two newer datasets with much 
higher sample sizes than the original NES Senate study (the Annenberg surveys 2000-
2004 and exit poll data for the 2004 elections) in order to limit the measurement error and 
to run errors-in-variables regression. Conclusive statistical evidence could not be found in 
favor of the differential representation hypothesis. For the Annenberg data, high-income 
ideology was the only significant variable in all regressions, but it was not statistical 
different from low-income ideology. For the exit poll data, the expected unevenness in 
favor of the high-income group was only present for the 2nd dimension of the DW-
nominates, and only when the break-down of income groups was done state-wise. This is 
peculiar, since both dataset could be expected to be superior to the original NES Senate 
study due to much higher sample sizes for each group. 
 We suspect the reason for our failure to confirm Bartels’ results in the newer 
datasets was multicollinearity, and hence higher standard errors (and less stable 
parameter estimates) compared to the NES Senate study. This was caused by much 
higher correlations between the income groups’ ideologies than in the original study. The 
fact that the income groups’ average ideologies are very similar and vary closely together 
when reliable surveys are used indicates that the stakes are not particularly high when 
examining differential representation on the basis of general ideology. In this perspective, 
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it might be worthwhile for future research to look more into detail on differences between 
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Table 1: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate from mean state ideologies (101st 
to 103rd Congress). 
 Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
Mean ideology = 
1 to 7 scale 































 Note: Dependent variable in both regressions is Senator W-nominates. The coefficients 
are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by Senator in 
parentheses. Statistical significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05.   
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Table 2 Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate from income specific ideologies 












1 to 7 scale 
Wgt. low-income ideology ( LL PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. middle-income ideology ( MM PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. high-income ideology ( HH PX ) 
 
 




























































Note: Dependent variable in all regressions is Senator specific W-nominates. Wgt. Low-
income ideology, Wgt. middleincome-ideology and Wgt. high-income ideology are the 
raw mean ideologies for the respective groups times the proportion of that group. The 
coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by 
Senator in parentheses. Statistical significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, 
”*”=.01<p<.05.  . 
 
 24
Table 3: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate from income specific ideologies 
(101st to 103rd Congress). Replicated results with proportions added. 
 Replication, 
Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
Replication, 
Mean ideology = 
 1 to 7 scale 
Wgt. low-income ideology ( LL PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. middle-income ideology ( MM PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. high-income ideology ( HH PX ) 
 
 
Republican Senator dummy 
 
 
Proportion low-income ( ) LP
 
 



















































Note: Dependent variable in both regressions is Senator specific W-nominates. Wgt. 
Low-income ideology, Wgt. middleincome-ideology and Wgt. high-income ideology are 
the raw mean ideologies for the respective groups times the proportion of that group. The 
groups are defined nationally. Proportion low-income and Proportion high-income 
denotes the proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the unstandardized 
regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses. Statistical 
significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05.    
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Table 4: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate from income specific ideologies, 
defined state-wise (101st to 103rd Congress). 
 Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
Mean ideology = 
1 to 7 scale 
Low-income ideology ( LX ) 
 
 
Middle-income ideology ( MX ) 
 
 
High-income ideology ( HX ) 
 
 








































Note: Dependent variable in both regressions is Senator specific W-nominates. Low-
income ideology, Middle-income ideology and High-income ideology are the mean 
ideologies for each group where the group is defined state-wise (i.e. one-third in each 
state), not nationally. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses. Statistical significance: 
”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05 
 26
Table 5: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate (106st-108th Congress)from 
mean state ideologies. (Annenberg Study Data)   
Mean ideology for voting-age population 




















Note: Dependent variable in is Senator W-nominates. The coefficients are the 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by Senator in 
parentheses. Statistical significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05. 
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Table 6: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate (106st-108rd Congress).from 
income-specific ideologies, defined nationally.  (Annenberg Study data)  
 Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
Wgt. low-income ideology ( LL PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. middle-income ideology ( MM PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. high-income ideology ( HH PX ) 
 
 
Republican Senator dummy 
 
 
Proportion low-income ( ) LP
 
 





























Note: Dependent variable is Senator specific W-nominates. Wgt. Low-income ideology, 
Wgt. middleincome-ideology and Wgt. high-income ideology are the raw mean 
ideologies for the respective groups times the proportion of that group. The groups are 
defined nationally. Proportion low-income and Proportion high-income denotes the 
proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression 
coefficients. Standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses. Statistical significance: 
”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05. 
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Table 7: Predicting roll call ideology (106st-108rd Congress)in the Senate from 
income-specific ideologies, defined state-wise.  (Annenberg Study data) 
 Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
- Mean ideology = 
-1 to +1 scale 
EIVREG 
Low-income ideology ( LX ) 
 
 
Middle-income ideology ( MX ) 
 
 
High-income ideology ( HX ) 
 
 







































Note: Dependent variable the regression is Senator specific W-nominates. Low-income 
ideology, Middle-income ideology and High-income ideology are the mean ideologies 
for each group where the group is defined state-wise (i.e. one-third in each state), not 
nationally. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard 





Table 8: Predicting roll call ideology in the Senate from income-specific ideologies, 
defined nationally (2004 Exit Poll data). 









Wgt. low-income ideology ( LL PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. middle-income ideology ( MM PX ) 
 
 
Wgt. high-income ideology ( HH PX ) 
 
 
Republican Senator dummy 
 
 
Proportion low-income ( ) LP
 











































































Note: Dependent variables are different versions of Senator specific DW-nominates. The 
composite measure is .74 times 1st dimension score plus .26 times 2nd dimension score. 
Wgt. Low-income ideology, Wgt. middleincome-ideology and Wgt. high-income 
ideology are the raw mean ideologies for the respective groups times the proportion of 
that group. The groups are defined nationally. Proportion low-income and Proportion 
high-income denotes the proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical 
significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05. 
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Table 9: The influence of general opinion on the three versions of DW-nominate. 




















































Note: Dependent variables are different versions of Senator specific DW-nominates. The 
composite measure is .74 times 1st dimension score plus .26 times 2nd dimension score. 
The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical significance: ”***”=p<.001, “**”=.001<p<.01, ”*”=.01<p<.05. 
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Table 10: Predicting Roll Call Ideology from Ideology of State Income Groups, 
Defined by within-State income  














High-income ideology  
 
 



























































Note: Dependent variables are different versions of Senator specific DW-nominates. .The 
composite measure is .74 times 1st dimension score plus .26 times 2nd dimension score. 
Low-income ideology = ideology of voters in state’s lowest third of family income;  
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Appendix – descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for the three surveys 
For simplicity, all tables in the appendix are based on the -1- to +1 scale. The statistics 
for the various decompositions of income groups are substantively very similar. 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for NES Senate study (-1 to +1 scale). 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
W-nominate 1st dimension -.19 0.54 -1.0 .99 303 
Low-income ideology 0.14 0.11 -0.09 0.33 303 
Middle-income ideology 0.15 0.09 -0.03 0.37 303 
High-income ideology 0.13 0.09 -0.10 0.32 303 
Overall mean ideology 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.31 303 
Republican Senator .44 0.50 0 1 303 
 
Table 12: Correlation matrix for NES Senate study (-1 to +1 scale). 
 WN LII MII HIO OMI RS 
W-nominate 1st dimension (WN) -      
Low-income ideology (LII) .01 -     
Middle-income ideology (MII) .17 .31 -    
High-income ideology (HIO) .31 .30 .33 -   
Overall mean ideology (OMI) .23 .71 .78 .69 -  
Republican Senator (RS) .89 -.04 .00 .09 .04 - 
Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations.  
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 Table 13: Descriptive statistics for the Annenberg 2000 and 2004 (-1 to +1 scale).  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
W-nominate 1st dimension -.02 0.73 -1 1.0 291 
Low-income ideology 0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.17 291 
Middle-income ideology 0.10 0.06 -0.02 0.21 291 
High-income ideology 0.12 0.09 -0.09 0.34 291 
Overall mean ideology 0.10 0.06 -0.05 0.21 291 
Republican Senator .52 0.50 0 1 291 
 
Table 14: Correlation matrix for the Annenberg 2000 and 2004 (-1 to +1 scale).  
 WN LII MII HIO OMI RS 
W-nominate 1st dimension (WN) -      
Low-income ideology (LII) .26 -     
Middle-income ideology (MII) .42 .64 -    
High-income ideology (HIO) .48 .67 .86 -   
Overall mean ideology (OMI) .46 .79 .93 .96 -  
Republican Senator (RS) .95 .15 .31 .36 .33 - 
Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations.  
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 Table 15: Descriptive statistics for exit poll data (-1 to +1 scale).  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
DW-nominate 1st dimension .02 0.46 -0.60 .48 101 
Low-income ideology 0.06 0.11 -0.16 0.28 101 
Middle-income ideology 0.15 0.12 -0.18 0.34 101 
High-income ideology 0.20 0.15 -0.09 0.49 101 
Overall mean ideology 0.14 0.12 -0.12 0.34 101 
Republican Senator .48 .50 0 1 101 
 
Table 16: Correlation matrix for the exit poll data. 
 WN LII MII HIO OMI RS 
DW-nominate 1st dimension 
(WN) 
-      
Low-income ideology (LII) .48 -     
Middle-income ideology (MII) .65 .75 -    
High-income ideology (HIO) .64 .80 .90 -   
Overall mean ideology (OMI) .65 .86 .96 .96 -  
Republican Senator (RS) .93 .35 .51 .51 .52 - 
Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations.  
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